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statements that are made, and also be broadly 
acceptable in a variety of legal systems?   
We believe that the answer is “yes”.  We are 
optimistic because a concept is emerging as 
a possible unifying concept for competition 
policy around the globe: the concept of 
“consumer choice.”  This is basically a way of 
systematically taking account of short term 
variety and non-price competition, and also 
long term innovation, as well as the traditional 
choices made on the basis of price and efficiency. 
The Emerging Concept in Europe
In Europe the concept of choice has mainly 
come to the foreground in Article 102 TFUE 
cases, which concern abuses by firms in 
dominant position. Traditionally, these cases 
are the ones where policy questions are asked 
and doctrine is developed. 
In Article 102 cases the European Commission 
has adopted a series of decisions, and the 
European courts have issued a number of 
rulings, which all go in the direction of 
protecting consumer choices in general, rather 
than only focusing on price competition.
In Microsoft, for instance, the Commission took 
great pains to explain, very clearly and explicitly, 
that consumer choice is the foundation of 
competition policy – and indeed of proper 
market functioning.1 The Commission’s main 
point was that by withholding substantial 
information and by tying its media software to 
its platform, Microsoft created a situation where 
customers were prevented from making real 
choices based on their non-price preferences: 
choices that would have allowed them to opt for 
the products corresponding best to their needs 
if  the markets had been competitive. 
The reasoning underlying this holding is that 
the effects on variety, non-price competition, 
and innovation can be most accurately assessed 
if  they are assessed directly.  In theory one 
could translate these factors into some measure 
1 Commission Decision, of  24.03.2004, relating to a proceeding under 
article [102] of  the EC treaty (case COMP/c-3/37.792 Microsoft), 
available in full on the web site of  DG COMP. 
R
ecent years have witnessed the usual 
type of competition-related activity 
on both sides of the Atlantic. 
In Europe, new regulations and 
guidelines have been published on horizontal 
and vertical relationships.  In the United States, 
a new standard on resale price maintenance 
has been issued by the Supreme Court and 
new horizontal merger guidelines were released 
by the Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission. 
But all these specific developments have left 
unanswered the fundamental policy question 
that should be on the lips of competition 
lawyers around the globe:  Ultimately, what 
are we after?   What are our fundamental goals 
when we apply antitrust and competition rules?
Some will say this question already has been 
answered by our colleagues with a Chicago 
School orientation: we should only be 
concerned about economic efficiency, so what 
we should do is to figure out the most efficient 
legal rules. 
Others contend, however, competition regimes 
around the world want to take account of a 
wider variety of values.  The laws of some 
jurisdictions care about a number of different 
values, even including non-economic concerns.  
Regardless, surely we all agree that to the extent 
possible it would be better for international firms 
to be able to better understand the competition 
laws that roughly 200 nations have today, in the 
hope that this understanding will help them 
better to predict how they will be treated around 
the globe. This is especially important because 
even the very vocabulary used to characterize 
these laws is diverse. Whether in English or in 
French, people speak different languages when 
it comes to antitrust and competition.  Different 
words can be used to mean the same thing, and 
sometimes the same term can mean something 
different in different nations. 
And so the crucial question for the next 
generation of competition law is: can we 
develop a common intellectual framework that 
will both give coherence to the specific policy 
“Consumer choice” is where we are 
all going - so let’s go together
Abstract
Globalisation of business makes it 
important for firms to predict how their 
behaviour is likely to be treated in the 
roughly 200 nations that have competition 
laws. In that context, a crucial question is: 
are we in a position to develop a common 
intellectual framework that would give 
coherence to policy statements made on 
specific competition related issues and, at 
the same time, be acceptable, broadly, in 
a variety of legal systems, not necessarily 
based on identical assumptions? We believe 
that the answer is “yes”.  A concept is 
emerging as a possible source of unification 
for competition policies around the globe: 
the concept of “consumer choice”.
Avec l’internationalisation des échanges, 
il devient essentiel pour les entreprises 
de prédire comment leur comportement 
est susceptible d’être appréhendé dans les 
200 nations qui, à ce jour, ont adopté des 
règles de la concurrence. Dans ce contexte, 
un défi majeur est de construire un cadre 
intellectuel commun qui permettrait de 
justifier en profondeur les positions que 
nous adoptons à l’égard de problèmes 
particuliers en droit de la concurrence, tout 
en demeurant acceptable, en substance, 
dans un ensemble de systèmes juridiques, 
qui ne sont pas nécessairement fondés sur 
des valeurs identiques. Nous pensons que 
le défi peut être relevé. Un concept est en 
train d’émerger comme une source possible 
d’unification pour les politiques de la 
concurrence menées dans le monde entier : 
le concept de “choix du consommateur”.
@ See also in the electronic supplement: 
La notion de choix du consommateur : Point de rencontre des politiques de 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































to those products that would remain available, 
this can constitute a harm to customers over 
and above any effects on the price or quality of 
any given product.”
Consumer choice has also been taken into 
account by a large number of courts in the 
United States, and often has resulted in the 
condemnation of practices that had no direct 
effects on price.  In the 2011 Realcomp II 
decision, for example, the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals considered the conduct of a real-
estate listing service that tended to exclude 
low-price, low-service discount brokerages from 
the market.4 The court assumed that Realcomp 
did not set commission rates or prices and, in 
any event, firms offering more or less elaborate 
brokerage services might all have the same 
quality adjusted price.  
But the court nonetheless found a violation of 
the antitrust laws:  “Realcomp does not regulate 
rates of commission, offers of compensation, 
or other price terms; thus, we examine the 
effect of Realcomp’s restrictions on consumer 
choice, specifically, the reduction in competitive 
brokerage options available to home sellers.”  
These developments do not mean that enforcers 
or courts in Europe or the United States ignore 
consideration of price and efficiency, of course. 
In most cases those will be the most relevant 
dimensions of competition, and the most 
relevant subjects of consumer choice.  In both 
Europe and the United States, however, they no 
longer appear to be the sole subjects.
Choice as a point for global convergence
In light of these developments we believe that 
consumer choice is now a viable center point 
for the global convergence of competition 
law.  It is broadly consistent with a variety of 
national values, representing neither an extreme 
efficiency focus nor an extreme emphasis 
on social or political values.  And it is also 
consistent with the specifics of a wide variety 
of particular statutes.  It does not replace those 
statutes, but acts as an implementing concept to 
help explain, interpret and apply each of them 
in its own context.
Programme ahead
There is no doubt that more work needs to be 
done on and around the idea of “choice” in 
competition and antitrust before the concept 
can be used on a regular basis. For instance, 
behavioural economics has pointed out that 
4  Realcomp II, Ltd. V. FTC, 2011 WL 1261180 (April 6, 2011).  
of “quality adjusted price.”  That translation 
is, however, extraordinarily difficult to perform 
when it comes to innovation or qualities of 
fashion or personal preference, and it is not 
often even attempted very often.  Considering 
“choice” explicitly will make it possible to 
consider these non-price issues more effectively. 
This sort of reasoning was backed by the 
European courts in Microsoft2 and in many 
other cases. In Wanadoo3, for instance, the 
incumbent telecom operator argued that it had 
no incentive to sell at a loss because it would 
not be in a position to increase prices after the 
elimination of competition because barriers 
to entry were low, and thus high prices would 
immediately and inevitably attract potential 
competitors onto the market.  So, the firm 
asserted, there was no likelihood it would 
actually engage in predatory behaviour.  That 
argument appeared particularly powerful in 
terms of  traditional competition law, which 
is price-centered and focused on maximizing 
productive efficiency.   
Not at all, said the Court in its judgment: the 
goal of competition law is not only to ensure 
that prices remain low; it is also to guarantee 
that consumers are granted an opportunity to 
choose among a sufficient array of possibilities. 
On the facts of the case, the Court continued, 
the behaviour adopted by France Telecom may 
have caused prices to go down. But it also 
endangered the survival of a sufficient number 
of alternatives among which consumers would 
be able to choose the services which best suited 
their preferences.
Similar trend in the United States 
The concept of consumer choice has been 
similarly developing in the United States, as 
new ideas grow up through the cracks in the old 
Chicago School doctrines.  
One example may be found in the new 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, issued in 
August, 2010.  That contains a new idea, in 
section 6.4, to directly assess “innovation and 
product quality.”  The Guidelines note that 
adverse effects in these respects can constitute 
an antitrust violation in themselves:  “If  the 
merged firm would withdraw a product that a 
significant number of customers strongly prefer 
2 General Court, judgement of  17 September 2004, T-201/04, 
Microsoft v Commission, Report p. II- 3601. No appeal was lodged 
against the judgment. 
3 Wanadoo, Commission Decision (EEC) relating to a procedure 
under Article 82 EC (Case COMP/38.233 – Wanadoo Interactive); 
France Telecom SA v Commission of  the European Communities Case 
C-202/07 P [2009] ECR I-2369; France Telecom SA v Commission of  

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































 And there is the issue of “public choice 
theory”, which looks into the enforcers’own 
decision-making process and the reasons why 
official agents behave as they sometimes do. 
The question is whether competition choice 
theory might leave these agents with too much 
discretion. 
However, these issues should not prevent us 
from investigating the possibility that “choice” 
may prove an ideal meeting point between 
traditions within, and between, the United 
States and the European Union. In fact, that 
possibility is so real that, now, already, around 
the globe, several academics are proposing to 
make it the focus of their analysis and meetings 
in the months ahead. n
Neil Averitt











“choice” is not a value that should simply be 
maximized.  For example, at times consumers 
may be paralyzed by having too many choices. 
So the optimal level of choice must be that which 
competition and the free market would have 
offered, not the maximum possible number.
There is also a question of the possible limits 
on “choice” as the best means of protecting 
consumer interests.  Often we compel firms to 
provide information or stop providing deceptive 
information and then let consumers choose 
from among the products on the market.  The 
question, however, is when we should protect 
consumers by using consumer protection law 
and when we should do this by the use of 
competition law!  Or when we should use both? 
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